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Abstract—Graph-based Anomaly Detection (GAD) is becoming
prevalent due to the powerful representation abilities of graphs
as well as recent advances in graph mining techniques. These
GAD tools, however, expose a new attacking surface, ironically
due to their unique advantage of being able to exploit the
relations among data. That is, attackers now can manipulate
those relations (i.e., the structure of the graph) to allow some
target nodes to evade detection. In this paper, we exploit this
vulnerability by designing a new type of targeted structural
poisoning attacks to a representative regression-based GAD
system termed OddBall. Specifically, we formulate the attack
against OddBall as a bi-level optimization problem, where the
key technical challenge is to efficiently solve the problem in
a discrete domain. We propose a novel attack method termed
BinarizedAttack based on gradient descent. Comparing to prior
arts, BinarizedAttack can better use the gradient information,
making it particularly suitable for solving combinatorial op-
timization problems. Furthermore, we investigate the attack
transferability of BinarizedAttack by employing it to attack other
representation-learning-based GAD systems. Our comprehensive
experiments demonstrate that BinarizedAttack is very effective in
enabling target nodes to evade graph-based anomaly detection
tools with limited attacker’s budget, and in the black-box transfer
attack setting, BinarizedAttack is also tested effective and in
particular, can significantly change the node embeddings learned
by the GAD systems. Our research thus opens the door to
studying a new type of attack against security analytic tools that
rely on graph data.
Index Terms—Graph-base anomaly detection, Graph learning
and mining, Data poisoning attack, Adversarial machine learn-
ing, Discrete optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is a long-standing task in the field of
data science and engineering with the goal to spot unusual
patterns from the massive amount of data. Recently, due to
the powerful representation abilities of graphs as well as the
advances in graph mining and learning techniques, Graph-
based Anomaly Detection (GAD) is becoming prevalent across
a wide spectrum of domains. Various GAD systems are pro-
posed and deployed as an indispensable security component
in detecting, for example, fake accounts in social networks
[1], fraudulent transactions in the financial industry [2], and
Botnets in communication networks [3].
Those GAD systems, however, expose a new attacking
surface, ironically due to their unique advantage of being
able to exploit the connections among data (i.e., edges in
Fig. 1: Illustration of the structural attack to OddBall: OddBall
extracts features from the graph structure, using regression-
based approaches to compute the anomaly scores of nodes;
structural attacks then poison the graph structure, equivalently
manipulating the extracted features and finally resulting in
misleading anomaly scores. This example shows that structural
attacks significantly decrease the anomaly scores of some tar-
get nodes (red), allowing them to possibly evade the detection
of OddBall.
graphs). For example, in social network analysis, an attacker
can proactively manage her social ties, by adding or deleting
friendship connections, to reduce the probability of being
detected as malicious. That is, adversaries now can evade GAD
via manipulating the graph structure; we term this class of
attacks as structural attacks.
We thus initiate the study of structural attacks on GAD with
the goal of answering to what extend an attacker can evade the
detection of prevalent GAD tools by solely manipulating graph
structures. Studying such structural attacks has significant
practical implications. Previous research on evading detection
tools (e.g., PDF/Android malware detection [4]) primarily
operate in a feature space, where attackers manipulate the
extracted feature vectors. Consequently, it is known that the
manipulated feature vectors are hard to be mapped back to real
entities (e.g., PDF/Android software), affecting the effective-
ness of the actual attacks. In contrast, altering the structure of a
graph always corresponds to manipulating actual connections
among entities (e.g., friendships in social networks), making






















are scenarios where an attacker could have control of the
whole graph structure, allowing the global optimization of the
attacks. A representative example is the Command & Control
center in Botnets [3], which can coordinate the communication
among Bots, i.e., globally optimizing the structure of the
communication graph, to evade Botnets detection tools. These
practical threats imposed by structural attacks motivate us to
systematically study the attacker’s ability to evade GAD.
In this paper, we instantiate our study by attacking a family
of regression-based GAD algorithms termed OddBall [5].
In a nutshell (illustrated in Fig. 1), OddBall first extracts
structural features of each node in the graph, then builds
regression models over those features, and finally computes
the node anomaly scores. We focus on OddBall mainly due
to the following reasons. First, OddBall stands for a class
of simple while effective approaches that require much less
information from data, thus are widely adopted in practice.
Second, the hand-crafted features in OddBall are the results of
domain-specific knowledge, which well captures the intrinsic
structural characterizes of anomalies in the graph. In fact, the
features extracted in OddBall are also used as input in other
unsupervised deep-learning-based methods. In light of this,
attacking OddBall can also serve as a good proxy for attacking
other GAD tools. Indeed, we conducted such transfer attacks
in Section VI. Fig 1 illustrates the main idea of attacking
OddBall. By modifying the graph structure, an attacker is
equivalently changing the node features extracted by OddBall.
Consequently, the regression model built upon those features
would falsely output node anomaly scores.
However, attacking GAD systems such as OddBall faces
several challenges. First, GAD systems naturally feature an
unsupervised/semi-supervised setting, where all nodes reside
in a single graph. Attacking GAD thus is poisoning the
data from which the detection model is built, which is in
strong contrast to those attacks that are manipulating the
inputs to a fixed trained model. These poisoning attacks are
mathematically modeled as bi-level optimization problems,
which are notoriously hard to solve in the literature. Second,
structural attacks operate in a discrete domain, resulting in a
strategy space exponential in the graph size. Furthermore, the
discrete nature makes it hard to adopt gradient-descent-based
attack methods [6], [7], as the attacker now needs to make
binary decisions on deleting or keeping the connections in
the graph. Indeed as we will show later, trivially utilizing the
gradient information may result in non-effective attacks.
To tackle these challenges, we propose BinarizedAttack,
which is inspired by Binarized Neural Networks (BNN) [8] de-
signed for model compression. Specifically, BNN transforms
the real-valued model weights to discrete values +1/−1 to
reduce the model size. To find the discrete optimal weights,
BNN uses a continuous version of the weights when comput-
ing the gradients in the backward propagation. In light of this,
BinarizedAttack associates a discrete as well as a continuous
decision variable for each edge/non-edge in the graph and uses
a novel gradient-descent-based approach to solve the resulting
discrete optimization problem. Specifically, in the forward
pass, the discrete decision variables are used to evaluate
the objective function. In the backward pass, the continuous
decision variables are firstly updated based on the fractional
gradients, and the discrete ones are then updated accordingly.
In essence, BinarizedAttack could better use the gradient
information to guide the search for the optimal graph structure.
Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that BinarizedAttack
can effectively solve the discrete optimization problem and
outperforms other gradient-descent-based approaches.
We further study the attack transferability of
BinarizedAttack to other GAD systems. In practice, the
actual deployed GAD system could possibly be sensitive
information that could not be accessible to attackers. Thus, it
is of practical interests and significance to know how an attack
method purposely designed for a target system would perform
against other systems. In this paper, we use BinarizedAttack
designed for OddBall to attack two other GAD systems (GAL
[9] and ReFeX [10]) in a black-box manner. Our intuition
is that as OddBall can well capture the structural patterns
that are generically important for identifying anomalies,
BinarizedAttack has the ability to obfuscate those patterns
thus possibly evading any GAD systems that rely on graph
structures. Comprehensive experiments in Section VIII-C
demonstrate good attack transferability of BinarizedAttack.
Finally, we summarize the main contributions of this paper
as follows:
• New Vulnerability. We identify and initiate the study
of a new vulnerability of graph-based anomaly detection
systems. Our results show that by slightly modifying the
graph structure, attackers can successfully evade GAD
systems. The research opens the door to studying this new
type of attacks against graph-based learning systems.
• Effective Structural Poisoning Attacks. We model
structural poisoning attacks as bi-level discrete optimiza-
tion problems. Technically, we propose a novel gradient-
descent-based approach BinarizedAttack that can effec-
tively solve discrete optimization problems, outperform-
ing existing methods.
• Attack Transferability. We conduct comprehensive ex-
periments demonstrating that BinarizedAttack is also
effective in attacking other GAD systems in a black-box
setting, making BinarizedAttack highly practical.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related works
are highlighted in Section II. We introduce the target GAD
system in Section III and formulate the poisoning structural
attacks in Section IV. The attack methods are introduced in
Section V. We further investigate the attack transferability of
the proposed method and explore possible countermeasures in
Section VI and Section VII, respectively. We conduct com-
prehensive experiments to evaluate our methods from several
aspects in Section VIII. Finally, we conclude in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORKS
Graph-based anomaly detection. The essential task of
Graph-based Anomaly Detection (GAD) is to identify anoma-
lous patterns from graph data. It becomes prevalent due to
the powerful representation ability of graphs as well as the
advances in graph mining and learning techniques. Our focus
is anomaly detection on static graphs [11], where the graph
structure and node features would are fixed overtime. Rep-
resentative GAD can be roughly classified into four classes.
Specifically, feature-based methods [5], [12] extract hand-
crafted features from the graph and use typical machine
learning approaches to analyze those features. Proximity-based
methods [13] exploit the graph structure to measure the
distances among nodes and anomalous nodes are assumed
to have larger distances to other nodes. Community-based
methods [14] employ community detection approaches to
cluster normal nodes. Relational-learning-based methods [15],
[16] design graphical models to capture the relations among
nodes and cast anomaly detection as a classification problem.
Importantly, all these methods rely on the graph structure as
an essential input. More recently, there are methods based on
graph representation learning [9], [10], whose key component
is to learn the node embeddings via various technical as
such graph neural networks. We refer to [11] for a thorough
discussion of these GAD methods.
Adversarial graph analysis Our work belongs to a long
line of research that studies the adversarial robustness of
various graph analysis tasks, such as node classification [6],
[7], [17], link prediction [18], [19], community detection [20],
etc. For instance, [18] and [19] investigated structural attacks
against a wide range of similarity-based link prediction al-
gorithms. [6] and [7] initiated the study of the robustness of
graph neural networks under both targeted and untargeted at-
tacks. [20] investigated how an attacker can evade community
detection tools in social networks. On the defence side, a lot of
efforts have been devoted to enhancing the robustness of those
analytic tools under attacks. Representative approaches include
adding regularization terms [21] into the learning objective
function, robust optimization [17], injecting random noises
to create ensembled classifiers [22], purifying the poisoned
graphs [23], [24], and so on. All of the above works are task-
specific and the developed methods cannot be easily applied
to other tasks.
III. TARGET GAD SYSTEM
In this section, we introduce OddBall [5] as the repre-
sentative target GAD system of our attack. OddBall is an
unsupervised feature engineering approach. Given a graph,
OddBall extracts some carefully crafted features for each node
in the graph, and computes an anomaly score for each node
based on those features, where a larger score indicates that the
node is more likely to be anomalous.
To formalize, we denote a graph as G = (V,E), where
V denotes a set of n nodes and E represents the edges.
We consider a simple unweighted graph with the adjacency
matrix A ∈ {0, 1}n×n. OddBall focuses on the local structural
information of the nodes for anomaly detection. Especially, for
a node vi ∈ V , OddBall examines an Egonet egoi centered
at vi, where egoi is the reduced sub-graph contains vi and its
one-hop neighbors. An important finding of OddBall is that
the Egonets for anomalous nodes tend to appear in either a
near-clique or near-star structure (as shown in Fig. 2a). To
detect such anomalous structures (i.e., near-clique or near-
star), OddBall identifies two critical features Ei and Ni among
others from the Egonet egoi, where Ei and Ni denote the
number of edges and nodes in egoi, respectively. It was
observed that Ei and Ni follow an Egonet Density Power
Law [5]: Ei ∝ Nαi , 1 ≤ α ≤ 2. The nodes that significantly
deviate from this law are thus flagged as anomalous.
(a) Anomalous patterns











Fig. 2: (a) The near-clique (left) and near-star (right) structural
patterns. (b) The distribution of node features and the regres-
sion line. The anomaly score is measured as the distance from
a dot to the regression line along the vertical axis.
OddBall uses a regression-based approach to quantify the
deviation. Specifically, let vectors E = (E1, E2, · · · , En) and
N = (N1, N2, · · · , Nn) be the collected features of all nodes.
Based on the power law observation, one can use the following
linear model to fit the pair of features (Ei, Ni) for a node i:
lnEi = β0 + β1 lnNi + ε, (1)
where the model parameters β0 and β1 are given by the
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) [25] estimation as:
[β0, β1] = ([1, lnN]
T [1, lnN])−1[1, lnN]T lnE, (2)
where 1 is an n-dimensional vector of all 1’s.








ln(|Ei − eβ0Nβ1i |+ 1). (3)
Note that we made the dependency of Si(A) on A explicit
as all of β0, β1, Ei, Ni rely on A. As illustrated in Fig. 2b,
the anomaly score Si(A) intuitively measures the distance
between the point (Ni, Ei) and the regression line along the
vertical axis. Finally, nodes with high anomaly scores (e.g.,
exceeding a certain threshold) are determined as anomalous
by OddBall.
IV. FORMULATION OF STRUCTURAL POISONING ATTACKS
In this section, we formally formulate the structural poison-
ing attacks against OddBall [5].
A. Threat Model
We consider a system consisting of three parties: a defender,
an attacker, and the outside environment,, the interplay among
which is illustrated in Fig. 3. Specifically, a defender deploys
OddBall to detect anomalous nodes in an existing network.
In practice, the network is not readily available; instead, the
defender will need to construct the network via data collection.
We model data collections as a querying process where the de-
fender sends queries consisting of pairs of nodes (u, v) to the
environment, which responds with the existence of the relation
between u and v (i.e., whether there is an edge between u and
v). Then, based on the query results the defender can construct
an observed network. This querying process widely models
real-world scenarios such as taking surveys on friendships,
conducting field experiments to measure the communication
channels, etc.
An attacker, sitting between the defender and the outside
environment, can tamper with the above data collection proce-
dure by modifying the query results sent from the environment.
For example, as shown in Fig. 3, the defender makes a query
“Is there a relation between C and D?” to the environment;
an attacker can change the query result “{C,D} = 0” (non-
existence) to “{C,D} = 1” (existence), which is obtained by
the defender. Consequently, the attacker is inserting an edge in
the network constructed by the defender. That is, by modifying
the query results, the attacker is equivalently manipulating the
network topology, resulting in structural attacks. We state the
attacker’s goal, knowledge, and capability as follows.
Fig. 3: Interplay among defender, attacker and environment.
Defender sends queries to the environment and constructs an
observed network based on the query results. Meanwhile, an
attacker can modify the query results, equivalently manipulat-
ing the network topology.
• Attacker’s Goal. We assume that the attacker has a set
of target nodes within the network, which are risky nodes
that have relatively high anomaly scores initially. The
attacker’s goal is thus to enable these target nodes to
evade the detection.
• Attacker’s Knowledge. By Kerckhoffs’s principle, we
assume a worst-case scenario where the attacker has full
knowledge of the network structure as well as the GAD
system (i.e., OddBall) deployed by the defender. That
is, the attacker knows all the queries sent out by the
defender as well as the results to all those queries. Later
when considering transfer attacks, we relax this second
assumption and attack other GAD systems in a black-box
setting.
• Attacker’s Capability. Again, we consider a worst-case
scenario where the attacker can modify the query results
at her choice. That is the attacker has control of the global
structure of the graph and is able to add/delete edges from
the graph. To further constrain the attacker’s ability, we
assume that the attacker can add/delete up to B edges.
B. Attack Problem
We now formulate the attacks against GAD systems with
OddBall as an instantiation. We use G0 = (V0, E0) to repre-
sent the ground-truth graph in the environment. An attacker,
knowing the graph G0, has a set of target nodes T ⊂ V0, and
her goal is to reduce the probabilities that the nodes in T are
detected as anomalous. To this end, the attacker is allowed to
add or delete at most B edges in the graph G0 via tampering
with the data collection process. As a result, a manipulated
graph G = (V0, E) is observed by the defender, who will use
a GAD system to detect anomalous nodes based on G. We
use A0 and A to denote the adjacency matrices of G0 and G,
respectively.
We emphasize that the graph manipulation process (i.e.,
changing G0 to G) occurs before anomaly detection, resulting
in a poisoning attack, which more suitably captures the nature
of GAD in an unsupervised setting. Notably, the regression
model (more precisely, β0 and β1) changes as the graph is
modified. This also dramatically differentiates our structural
attacks to previous evasion attacks where the detection model
is fixed, and significantly complicates the design and realiza-
tion of structural attacks.
To evade detection, the attacker tries to minimize the
anomaly scores of the target nodes in T . In our formulation,

















i | + 1). For simplicity, in this paper, we consider the
equal weight case, i.e., ∀i, κi = 1, and our methods can
be easily extended to the case with unequal weights. Then
the attack can be formulated as the following optimization
problem:
A∗ = arg min
A
ST (A) (4a)
s.t. β∗0 , β
∗
1 = Regression(A), (4b)
1
2
||A0 −A||1 ≤ B, A ∈ {0, 1}n×n (4c)
where (4b) denotes the function of deriving the parameters
of the regression model from the graph A, the constraint (4c)
ensures that the attacker can modify at most B edges, and
A∗ is the optimal adversarial graph structure that the attacker
aims to find.
To solve the optimization problem (4), we re-formulate it
from several aspects. First, we note that the anomaly score
Si(A) for node vi is a normalized distance to the regression
line. To reduce the non-linearity and ease optimization, we





i | + 1) to approximate Si(A). Consequently, we will
use an objective function S̃T (A) =
∑





acting as the surrogate of ST (A) in the optimization process.
We emphasize that S̃T (A) is only used in the optimization
process and we use the true anomaly scores ST (A) for
evaluation. Second, for OLS point estimation, the regression
parameters β∗0 and β
∗
1 have closed-form solutions (Eqn. (2)),
allowing use to directly substitute β∗0 and β
∗
1 with functions
of A. At last, we can explicitly write the features Ni and
Ei as Ni =
∑n




ii. Finally, we can
re-formulate the attack problem as:


















||A0 −A||1 ≤ B, A ∈ {0, 1}n×n. (5c)
Solving the above discrete optimization problem leads to
optimal a structural attack.
V. ATTACK METHODS
In this section, we introduce three methods,
GradMaxSearch, ContinuousA, and BinarizedAttack, to
solve the optimization problem (5). Specifically, the first two
proposed methods GradMaxSearch and ContinuousA are
adapted from typical approaches in the literature for solving
similar problems. We further propose BinarizedAttack to
address their limitations.
A. Conventional Methods
Solving the optimization problem (5) to obtain the optimal
graph structure is hard in general, mainly due to the integer
variables involved. Thus a common approach is to relax the
integral constraints, transforming the optimization problem
to its continuous counterpart, for which gradient-descent-
based optimization techniques could be employed. Ideally, a
continuous optimal solution Ã∗ is obtained, which is then
transformed to a discrete solution A∗. This approach faces
two central challenges: i) how to use the gradient information
for the guidance of searching for Ã∗, and ii) how to discretize
Ã∗ to obtain A∗. Based on the previous works in the literature,
we propose two methods.
1) GradMaxSearch: Most of the previous works on struc-
tural attacks utilize a greedy strategy to solve the optimization
problem in an iterative way. Specifically, the integer constraints
on A are relaxed and in each iteration, the gradients of the
objective with respect to each entry of Ã are calculated. Then,
the entry with the largest gradient is picked for alternation (ei-
ther deleting or adding an edge). Intuitively, a larger gradient
indicates a bigger impact on the objective value. The iteration
continues until budget constraint B is reached. We implement
this idea and term the resulting algorithm as GradMaxSearch.
Regarding the implementation of GradMaxSearch, we note
that when picking the entry associated with the largest gradi-
ent, one should pay attention to the signs of the gradients.
For example, when Aij = 0 we need to ensure that the
corresponding gradient ∂AS(va)∂Aij < 0 (and vice versa) to
make the operation (add or delete) valid. In addition, to avoid
repeatedly adding and deleting the same edge, we maintain
a pool to record the edges that have not been modified.
Meanwhile, we also avoid the operations that would result
in singleton nodes.
2) ContinuousA: An apparent shortcoming of
GradMaxSearch is that the objective function is only
optimized through B steps, where B is the attacker’s budget.
An alternative way is thus to totally treat A as continuous
variables Ã ∈ [0, 1]n×n and optimize the objective function
until it converges. We term this method as ContinuousA.
In detail, by solving the optimization problem in the contin-
uous domain using gradient-descent, we obtain the sub-optimal
continuous solution Ã∗. We then calculate the differences in
absolute values between the original A and Ã∗, and pick
those edges associated with the top-B absolute differences to
modify.
B. BinarizedAttack
Both GradMaxSearch and ContinuousA have their own
limitations. For GradMaxSearch, one major limitation is that
the gradient only indicates a relatively small fractional update
on the corresponding entry in A; while a discrete value
(±1) is actually updated. This would not necessarily optimize
the objective. Moreover, due to budget constraint B, the
objective is only optimized through B steps. ContinuousA
treating A as continuous in the whole process of optimization,
totally ignoring the effect of discrete updates on the objective
function. Furthermore, without careful design, converting from
the fractional optimal solution Ã∗ to A∗ may lead to arbitrary
bad performances.
We propose BinarizedAttack to mitigate these limitations.
At a high level, BinarizedAttack is a gradient-descent-based
approach that optimizes the objective in iterations. Each iter-
ation consists of a forward pass, where the objective function
is evaluated on some decision variables, and a backward pass,
where the decision variables are updated based on calculated
gradients. The core idea of BinarizedAttack lies in the design
of two sets of decision variables as well as the way of utilizing
gradient information. Specifically, we associate each entry Aij
with a discrete dummy (the use of dummy will be explained
later) decision variable Zij ∈ {−1,+1}, where Zij = −1
indicates that the corresponding entry Aij will be modified
and vice versa. For example, if Aij = 1 and Zij = −1,
we will change Aij to 0. Let A0 and A be the original and
modified adjacency matrix, respectively, which are connected
through the decision variables Z by
A = (A0 − 0.5 · 1n×n) Z + 0.5, (6)
Algorithm 1: BinarizedAttack
Input: clean graph A0, anomaly score function AS,
target set V = {va}τa=1, budget B, hyper-parameter
set Λ = {λk}Kk=1, iteration number T , learning rate η.
Parameter: Perturbation Ż.
1: Let t = 0 and initialize Ż.
2: for k ← 1, 2, ...,K do
3: while t ≤ T do
4: Forward Pass:
5: Calculate Z = −binarized(2 · Ż− 1).
6: Calculate A = (A0 − 0.5 · 1n×n) Z + 0.5.
7: Calculate Ni =
∑n





8: Obtain goal function L({va}τa=1) according to
8a.
9: Backward Pass:
10: ∀i, j ∈ 1, 2, ..., n, calculate the gradient of the














16: for b← 1, 2, ..., B do
17: Pick out Ż = min L({va}τa=1) satisfies
∑
Z = −b.
18: Get poisoned graph
Ab = (A0 − 0.5 · 1n×n) Z + 0.5.
19: return Ab.
20: end for
where  denotes element-wise multiplication between two
matrices.
We further associate each entry Aij with a continuous soft
decision variable Ż ∈ [0, 1] to facilitate gradient computation.
The two sets of decision variables Ż and Z are related by
Z = −binarized(2 · Ż− 1), (7)
where we define the function binarized(x) as binarized(x) =
+1 if x ≥ 0 and binarized(x) = −1 otherwise. Since our
objective function S̃T (A) depends on A, we can easily rewrite
it as a function relying on the decision variables Ż and Z as
S̃T (Ż,Z).
We proceed to handle budget constraint (5c). Our goal is
to transform this constraint as part of the objective function
so that we can thoroughly optimize the objective beyond B
steps. To this end, we impose a LASSO penalty [26] on the
continuous soft decision variables Ż. Our choice of LASSO
comes from the fact that LASSO can obtain sparser solutions
compared with the L2 penalty [27]. Based on Eqn (7), we
can observe that a larger Żij indicates that it is more likely
to modify the entry Aij (i.e., Zij = −1). As a result, in the
optimization process, while the LASSO penalty term pushes
the entries in Ż to zero, it is also restricting the modifications
made to A, achieving a similar effect of the budget constraint.
Now, we can reformulate the attack problem as an optimiza-
tion problem with Ż and Z as decision variables:




(Ea − eρ)2 + λ||Ż||11 (8a)









A = (A0 − 0.5) Z + 0.5; . (8d)
Z = −binarized(2 · Z− 1). (8e)
Note that we used a parameter λ to tune the relative importance
of the adversarial objective and the penalty term.
Now, we can solve (8) through iteration. Specifically, in the
forward pass, we will evaluate the objective by the discrete
dummy variables Z. Intuitively, this will more accurately mea-
sure the effect of discrete updates of the graph structure on the
objective. In the backward pass, we can compute the gradients
with respect to Ż, and update Z from (8e). In this way, by
observing Ż, we can obtain the entries in A that the attacker
needs to modify. We note that the discrete variables Z are
only used to evaluate the objective function for optimization;
the final decisions are made from the soft variables Ż, thus the
reason why Z are called dummy variables. The pseudo-code
of BinarizedAttack is presented in Alg. 1.
VI. ATTACK TRANSFERABILITY
In this section, we investigate the attack transferability of
BinarizedAttack to two other GAD systems that are based on
representation learning.
A. Representation-learning-based GAD
Recently, graph analysis based on representation learning
has attracted extensive research attention. Graph representation
learning [28] aims to learn a low-dimensional latent vector for
each node (called embedding) that could capture the feature as
well as the structural information of the graph. Those learned
embeddings are then used in a wide range of down-stream
tasks such as node classification and link prediction. Following
this trend, graph representation learning has also been used as
the core technique for anomaly detection. These techniques
entitle the defender the freedom to chooce different GAD
systems in practice, which raises a practical question: could an
attack method that is specifically designed for a target GAD
system be effective to other GAD systems? We investigate this
problem of attack transferability by using BinarizedAttack to
attack two other GAD systems (GAL [9] and ReFeX [10])
based on graph representation learning.
At a high level, representation-learning-based GAD systems
have two components: representation learning and classifi-
cation. First, given a graph as input, the system learns the
embeddings of nodes using various methods (e.g., graph neural
networks, random walk, etc.). These embeddings are then
fed into classifiers such as Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
which will classify nodes as anomalous or benign. These GAD
systems differ mainly in the methods used for learning the
node embeddings. We focus on two representative systems as
below.
1) GAL [9]: GAL utilizes Graph Neural Networks [29]
(GNNs) to learn the node embeddings. In particular, GAL
replaced the loss function in typical GNNs with a graph
anomaly loss that is specially designed for anomaly detection.
It is a class-distribution-aware margin loss which solves the
imbalanced problem in anomaly detection via automatically
adjusting the margins for the minority class (i.e., anomaly).
Specifically, the loss on node u is computed as:







Here Uu+ denotes the set of nodes share the same label with u,
and vice versa. g(u, u′) = f(u)T f(u′) measures the similarity
of the representation of two nodes u and u′, f is the GNN. C
is the constant hyperparameter to be tuned. ∆yu is proved to
best weigh up between the improvement of the generalization
of minority class and the sub-optimal margin for the frequent
class.
2) ReFeX [10]: ReFeX (Recursive Feature eXtraction) is
a novel algorithm that combines node-based local features
with neighborhood (ego-based) features recursively, and output
regional features which can capture the behavior information
in large social networks. ReFeX aggregates the local and ego-
based features and use them to create recursive features. Local
features are essentially node degree measures. Egonet features
are N and E as mentioned in Section III. ReFeX recurses
the local and ego-based features by calculating their means
and sums. Next ReFeX implements the pruning method using
vertical logarithmic binning. At last, ReFeX transforms the
pruned recursive features to binary-valued embeddings. The
pruned recursive features proved to efficiently capture the inner
structural information provided by the graph. In this paper, we
make use of these features for node anomaly detection.
B. Transfer attack methodology
Our transfer attack to both GAL and ReFeX consists of
four steps: data pre-processing, targets identification, graph
poisoning and evaluation.
1) Data pre-processing: OddBall operates in an unsuper-
vised setting while both GAL and ReFeX are supervised
methods. We thus pre-process the data by assigning anomaly
labels to a set of nodes. Specifically, given a graph, we first use
OddBall to compute the anomaly scores for all the nodes and
label those nodes with high anomaly scores as anomalous. We
then randomly split the nodes into training and testing sets.
2) Targets identification: As BinarizedAttack is a targeted
attack, the goal of our transfer attack is not to decrease the
prediction accuracies of the GAD systems. Instead, we are
interested in changing the prediction results of a set of nodes
– those nodes that are initially predicted as anomalous by the
GAD systems. Thus, we feed the pre-process data into GAL
or ReFeX and obtain the predicted labels of the test nodes and
pick those nodes predicted as anomalous as our attack targets.
3) Graph poisoning: With the targeted nodes identified
from the previous step, we directly use BinarizedAttack to
generate a poisoned graph. We emphasize that the attack
occurred in a black-box setting, where we do not need any
information from GAL nor ReFeX.
4) Evaluation: We provide the clean graph and poisoned
graph separately as input to GAL and ReFeX. We evaluate
the performance of transfer attack mainly from two aspects: 1)
whether the target nodes can successfully evade the detection
of GAL or ReFeX; 2) the changes of node embeddings
generated by GAL and ReFeX before and after attack.
We present the detailed experiment settings and results in
Section VIII.
VII. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
Defense approaches against data poisoning attacks have
been extensive studied mainly in the computer vision domain.
Typical methods include sanitizing the dataset by identifying
and removing the maliciously injected data points, training
robust models that could still perform well on poisoned data,
and so on. More recently, there are also works that explore
defense approaches in the graph learning domain. For example,
based on the observation that netattack [6] tends to increase
the rank of the adjacency matrix, [24] proposed the low-rank
approximation of the adjacency matrix by SVD for defense.
Graph variational autoencoder is used in [30] to generate
a smooth adjacency matrix to defend two popular attacks
metattack [7] and netattack. A robust GCN [29] model is
proposed in [31] by formulating the Gaussian distribution
based on the hidden features of GCN and penalizing the high
variance to enhance the robustness. [32] and [33] introduced
the attention mechanism to decrease the effect of adversarial
links in the attacked graph.
In this paper, we further explore possible countermeasures to
defend against BinarizedAttack. Our key observation is that,
since OLS [25] estimation is sensitive to poisoned data in
the training process, we can use robust estimators instead to
estimate the regression parameters. Huber [34] proposed the





t2, if |t| ≤ k
k|t| − 1
2
k2, if |t| > k,
(10)
where k is the hyper-parameter to penalize the outliers linearly
instead of quadratically.
Random Sample Consensus (RANSAC [35]) uses Huber
loss with k = 1 for robust estimation. It was known that
RANSAC is able to estimate the model parameters that achieve
high accuracy even when the dataset contains a significant
number of outliers. In light of this, we adopt the robust
estimation method from RANSAC to estimate the parameters
of OddBall (thus a robust version of OddBall) from the poi-
soned graph generated by BinarizedAttack. Our experiments
show that this robust estimation approach can slightly mitigate
the attack effect. The defense of structural poisoning attack
remains as an important future work.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets and Experiment Settings
We evaluate the algorithms on two synthetic and three real-
world datasets:
1) Synthetic datasets: We use two random graph models,
Erdos-Renyl (ER) [36] and Barabasi-Albert (BA) [37], to
generate graphs with a node number of 1000. For ER graphs,
we set the link probability as 0.02. We create BA graphs with
m = 5, where m is the number of edges attaching from a new
node to existing nodes.
2) Real-world datasets: Blogcatalog [38] is a social net-
work indicating follower/followee relationships among blog-
gers in a blog sharing website. The network has 88,800 nodes
and 2.1M edges. Wikivote [39] contains all the Wikipedia
voting data from the inception of Wikipedia till January 2008.
Nodes in the network represent Wikipedia users and the edge
represents that user i voted on user j. The dataset contains
around 7000 nodes and 0.1M edges. Bitcoin-Alpha [40]
is a who-trusts-whom social network of traders who trade
Bitcoin on the Bitcoin-Alpha platform. It is a weighted signed
network with weights ranging from +10 to −10. It has more
than 3000 nodes and 24186 edges. We pre-process the data
by removing all the negative edges and erasing the weights of
all the remaining edges, resulting in an unsigned unweighted
version of Bitcoin-Alpha. For all the three real datasets, we
randomly sample the connected sub-graph with around 1000
nodes from the whole graph. The statistics of the real datasets
are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Statistics of datasets
ER BA Blogcatalog Wikivote Bitcoin-Alpha
# of nodes 1000 1000 1000 1012 1025
# of edges 9948 4975 6190 4860 2311
3) Settings: For all datasets we determine our target set by
sampling 10 or 30 target nodes from the top-50 nodes based
on AScore (From now on we denote anomaly score as AScore
for simplicity) rankings. For each experiment we sample target
nodes 5 times individually and report the mean values to
measure the efficacy of the structural attack on OddBall. For
structural attack (add/delete edges) on node anomaly detection,
we aim to minimize the AScore sums for target set V under
different budget constraint. We determine the max budget B
for each case by the convergence of AScore for the three
structural attack. We stop attacking until the changes of AScore
saturated.
B. Attack Performance of BinarizedAttack
1) Effectiveness of attack: Our main focus is to investigate
whether the proposed attack methods can effectively decrease
AScores of the target nodes. We use the Decreasing Percent-
age of Anomaly Score denoted as τas as the evaluation metric.




























































































































































































Fig. 4: Changes in AScores for ER graph, BA graph, Bitcoin-
Alpha, Blogcatalog and Wikivote
Specifically, let S0T and S
B
T be the sum of AScores of the
target nodes before attack and after an attack with a budget
B, respectively. Then, τas is defined as τas = (S0T −SBT )/S0T .
Fig. 4 presents the τas of three attack methods,
BinarizedAttack, GradMaxSearch, and ContinuousA, with
varying attack power. In particular, the attack power is mea-
sured as a percentage B|E| , where |E| is the number of edges
in the clean graph. We note that in all the cases, the attacker
has modified very limited edges in the graph: less than 2%
when |V | = 10 and less than 5% when |V | = 30. On average,
for each target node, the number of modified edges is around
4 for Bitcoin-Alpha, 5 for Blogcatalog and 9 for Wikivote.
We can observe from Fig. 4 that both BinarizedAttack
and GradMaxSearch can significantly (up to 90%) decrease
AScores with very limited power while ContinuousA is not
effective in several cases. This demonstrated the unpredictable
feature of ContinuousA when converting continuous solutions
(a) Case 1: Add edges (b) Case 2: Delete edges
(c) Case 3: Add/Delete edges
Fig. 5: Attacker implemented BinarizedAttack method on the
three target nodes v603, v657 and v554. In the case 1, the
attacker add edges to the clean graph, the AScore decreases
from 6.05 to 0.69; in the case 2, the attack delete the edges
to the clean graph, the AScore decreases from 8.4 to 0.29; in
the case 3, the attacker add and delete edges simultaneously
to decrease the anomaly node v554’s AScore from 5.34 to
0.42. We observe that in these three cases BinarizedAttack
indeed force the near-star and near-clique Egonets to become
’normal’ ones, i.e., the edges density inside the Egonets is at
a rational level
to discrete ones. Our main method BinarizedAttack consis-
tently achieves the best performance in all cases. We note that
the margin between BinarizedAttack and GradMaxSearch is
significant (with a > 10% performance improvement) when
the attack power is high (although the two lines look close in
the figures). For example, in Fig. 4h, when the attack power
is 2.77%, BinarizedAttack outperforms GradMaxSearch by
13.32%. One intriguing observation is that the gap be-
tween BinarizedAttack and GradMaxSearch becomes larger
when we increase the attacker’s budget. The reason is that
GradMaxSearch is a greedy strategy in nature and should
performs well when modifying a few edges; meanwhile, it
is also myopic when the budget is large.
We further show in Fig. 5 how BinarizedAttack will actually
modify the structure of a real-world graph (Wikivote as the
example). We demonstrated three cases, where the attacker
deletes edges only, adds edges only, and deletes and adds edges
simultaneously. It shows that BinarizedAttack will indeed
break the anomalous structural patterns (i.e., near-star and
near-clique) in the graph.
2) Preferences of attack: In the previous experiment eval-
uation, we select a set of target nodes that have relatively
high AScores and measure the attack performance by the
decreasing percentage of the score sum as a whole. It is
also important to investigate the different attack effects on
individual targets. We thus group the nodes according to their
initial AScores in the clean graph. Specifically, we assign the
10% percentile and 90% percentile (q1 and q2) for AScores
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Fig. 6: Structural attack on Blogcatalog with different target
set. (a) is the decreasing percentage of AScores for different
cases; (b) is linear regression for the clean graph; (c) is linear
regression for the poisoned graph.
histogram as thresholds. Using the thresholds q1 and q2, we
split all the nodes into three groups: low level, medium level,
and high level, based on their AScores. We randomly pick
out 10 nodes from each group and treat the 30 nodes as
the target set T . We report the decreasing percentage τas as
under BinarizedAttack for each group separately in Fig. 6. We
observe that the changes of the distance between high-level
nodes and the regression lines with clean graph and poisoned
graph is larger than that of low-level and medium-level nodes.
This phenomenon supports the saying that BinarizedAttack
tends to exert more influence on high-level anomaly nodes.
3) Side effect of attack: BinarizedAttack is a poisoning
targeted attack that aims to mislead the predictions of a small
set of target nodes. A desirable feature is that the attack would
not significantly change the data distribution to the extent that
the poisoned data would look abnormal for a defender. In other
words, an attacker wants to make the attack unnoticeable.
In our context, BinarizedAttack modifies the features
(Ni,Ei) of the ego-net centered at node i. By design,
BinarizedAttack will significantly modify the features of
targeted nodes; however, an inevitable side effect is that
BinarizedAttack would also change the features of the rest
of the nodes. In the worst case, the shift of the feature distri-
butions caused by an attack is so large that the attacked graph
would appear abnormal and be rejected by the defender. Thus,
ideally, we would expect the side effect of BinarizedAttack is
reasonably small to achieve an unnoticeable attack.
We thus experiment to investigate the distribution shift
of the features (N,E) before and after BinarizedAttack.
Specifically, we use the permutation test [41], which is a
non-parametric test to check whether two different groups
follow the same distribution. However, it will be NP-hard if
we consider all kinds of perturbations in the concatenation of
two group data, we instead use the Monte Carlo method to
approximate the p-value, which is computed as:





I(tj ≥ t0), (11)
where t0 is the observed value of test statistic and











n) = |x̄′ − ȳ′|, M is the Monte
Carlo sampling times (in the experiment we set M =
100000). x and y can be either Nclean and Npoisoned
or Eclean and Epoisoned. x′ and y′ are re-samples of
Concat[Nclean||Npoisoned] or Concat[Eclean||Epoisoned].
We report the p-value of ego-features N and E on three
real datasets: Bitcoin-Alpha, Blogcatalog and Wikivote. The
results are shown in Tab. II, where we consider ego-features
of the poisoned graph with maximum perturbations and |V | =
30.
TABLE II: p-values for ego-features.
t
p features Bitcoin-Alpha Blogcatalog Wikivote
N E N E N E
1 0.72 0.04 0.72 0.12 0.56 0.02
2 0.66 0.03 0.65 0.06 0.58 0.02
3 0.75 0.04 0.67 0.06 0.56 0.01
4 0.72 0.04 0.71 0.12 0.57 0.02
5 0.71 0.03 0.7 0.14 0.56 0.005
From Tab. II we notice that under 99% significant level we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that Nclean and Npoisoned
follows the same distribution, that is, we can draw the conclu-
sion that BinarizedAttack does not manipulate the distribution
of N. For ego-feature E, in most cases, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis. However, in experiment 5 for Wikivote
the p-value is less than 1%, so we reject the null hypothesis,
that is, in Wikivote experiment 5 BinarizedAttack manipulate
the distribution of E under the significant level 99%. The
probability density function of Nclean and Npoisoned and
Eclean and Epoisoned are presented in Fig. 7 (we take Bitcoin-
Alpha as an example).













distribution of N for clean graph
distribution of N for poisoned graph
(a) Bitcoin-Alpha N













distribution of E for clean graph
distribution of E for poisoned graph
(b) Bitcoin-Alpha E
Fig. 7: The probability density function of ego-features N and
E for clean and poisoned graphs of Bitcoin-Alpha
C. Attack Transferability
We follow the procedure in Section VI-B to conduct transfer
attacks against GAL and ReFeX on Bitcoin-Alpha and Wikiv-
ote. We use the configurations in [9] and [10] to implement
GAL and ReFeX, respectively. We measure the attack effects
on classification results as well as node embeddings.
1) Classification results: BinarizedAttack is a targeted
attack. To evaluate the effects more comprehensively, we
measure both the global and targeted classification accuracies
of GAL and ReFeX under attack. Specifically, for global
classification accuracies, we compare the AUC and F1 scores
on all test nodes before and after attack. For targeted clas-
sification accuracies, we use the changes in soft labels [42]
of the targeted nodes as the metric. A soft label is a score
(probability) of an entity which belong to one class in a
classifier. Specifically, in the representation learning litera-
ture, the sum of soft labels for target nodes is defined as:∑K
i=1 Pi(Yi = 1|θ) =
∑K
i=1 fθ(Xemb), fθ(·) is the classifier
MLP with parameter θ, Xemb is the node embeddings learned
by GAL or ReFeX. Referring to [42], soft labels have high
entropy which provide much more information than the hard
labels, thus can capture the quality of embeddings in this
scenario more precisely. Let SL0 and SLB denote the sum of
soft labels before and after attack with budget B. We use the
decreasing percentage of soft labels as the metric, defined
as δB = (SL0 − SLB)/SL0.
The classification results of GAL and ReFeX are presented
in Table III and Table IV. We can observe that BinarizedAttack
have limited effect on the global classification accuracies of
both GAL and ReFeX (refer to the AUC and F1 columns).
However, BinarizedAttack can significantly decrease the soft
labels (around 25%) with very limited budgets. We emphasize
that this observation actually reflects a desirable feature of
BinarizedAttack as a targeted attack. That is, BinarizedAttack
would not severely downgrade the overall performance of
the system, which avoids attracting attention from system
defenders; however, it can significantly mislead the system’s
predictions on the targets.
TABLE III: Classification accuracy for the GAL embeddings
provided for the anomaly classification task.
Bitcoin-Alpha Wikivote
Edge changed (%) AUC F1 δB (%) AUC F1 δB (%)
0 0.72 0.85 0 0.68 0.77 0
0.2 0.71 0.84 10.87 0.67 0.74 19.49
0.4 0.71 0.84 14.20 0.65 0.72 19.43
0.6 0.68 0.82 14.46 0.68 0.76 23.29
0.8 0.69 0.83 16.30 0.65 0.72 24.55
1.0 0.67 0.82 20.00 0.65 0.76 26.61
1.2 0.68 0.83 18.42 0.59 0.69 28.02
1.4 0.68 0.82 18.76 0.65 0.72 26.00
1.6 0.65 0.81 23.16 0.66 0.74 23.97
1.8 0.66 0.82 21.60 0.66 0.75 26.45
2.0 0.65 0.81 25.69 0.6 0.71 25.25
TABLE IV: Classification accuracy for the ReFeX embeddings
provided for the anomaly classification task
Bitcoin-Alpha Wikivote
B AUC F1 δB (%) B AUC F1 δB (%)
0 0.79 0.9 0 0 0.84 0.92 0
5 0.76 0.89 15.15 10 0.81 0.92 16.52
10 0.77 0.89 15.50 20 0.79 0.9 20.55
15 0.76 0.9 19.81 30 0.81 0.91 26.00
20 0.74 0.89 21.42 40 0.72 0.88 36.31
25 0.72 0.88 25.30 50 0.7 0.87 41.40
30 0.73 0.89 24.91 60 0.68 0.88 49.52
35 0.72 0.88 31.78 70 0.7 0.88 54.71
40 0.73 0.89 31.05 80 0.66 0.87 56.16
45 0.75 0.88 31.34 90 0.64 0.86 56.02
50 0.72 0.88 33.27 100 0.66 0.87 56.37
2) Node embeddings: As both GAL and ReFeX are
representation-learning-based methods, it is important to see
the qualities of the node embeddings under attack. We thus
further provide the visualization of node embeddings before
and after attack to highlight the differences. To this end, we
use a dimension reduction method t-SNE [43] to visualize the
penultimate hidden features of the classifier MLP of the testing
nodes in 2-D space. Referring to [44], the penultimate hidden
features of the MLP will form the linear separable space in 2-
D space after dimension reduction (PCA [45] or t-SNE [43]).
Ideally, we can expect that before attack, there is a clear
linear decision boundary between the anomalous nodes and
the benign nodes. After the attack, the anomalous nodes are
mixed in the benign ones. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 shows that
BinarizedAttack can indirectly influence the quality of the
node embeddings and thus break the linear separable decision
boundary of the anomaly detection system.










test nodes except target nodes
(a) Bitcoin-Alpha clean graph






test nodes except target nodes
(b) Bitcoin-Alpha with B = 50










test nodes except target nodes
(c) Wikivote clean graph






test nodes except target nodes
(d) Wikivote with B = 100
Fig. 8: Scatterplot of GAL embeddings of penultimate hidden
features for clean graph and poisoned graph of Bitcoin-Alpha
and Wikivote in 2-D space
D. Countermeasures against BinarizedAttack
In this part, we further analyze the possible defence method
against BinarizedAttack. We retrain the linear model based
on the clean graph and poisoned graphs with different pertur-
bations by Huber regressor [34] and RANSAC [35] method.
We compare the AScores of two robust estimations with OLS
estimation. The experiments are implemented based on the
two real datasets: Bitcoin-Alpha and Wikivote. The attack
method is BinarizedAttack. We randomly select 10 nodes as
our target nodes for BinarizedAttack. For each of the dataset,
we implement the experiments 5 times respectively and report
the percentage of the decreasing of the total AScores for the
target set. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 10.
From Fig. 10 we observe that both Huber regression
and RANSAC can slightly mitigate the attack. But overall,
BinarizedAttack remains a very effective attack. We leave the
defense of BinarizedAttack as future work.
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(a) Bitcoin-Alpha clean graph









test nodes except target nodes
(b) Bitcoin-Alpha with B = 50







test nodes except target nodes
(c) Wikivote clean graph







test nodes except target nodes
(d) Wikivote with B = 100
Fig. 9: Scatterplot of ReFeX embeddings of penultimate
hidden features for clean graph and poisoned graph of Bitcoin-
Alpha and Wikivote in 2-D space


















































Fig. 10: Defence against BinarizedAttack
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we initiate the study to investigate the vulner-
ability of graph-based anomaly detection under structural poi-
soning attacks. Specifically, we use OddBall as a representative
target GAD system and mathematically formulate the attacks
against it as a bi-level optimization problem. To address the
technical challenge of solving the combinatorial optimization
problem, we propose a novel gradient-descent-based method
BinarizedAttack, which effectively enables target nodes to
evade anomaly detection, significantly outperforming existing
methods. We further use BinarizedAttack to attack other
representation-learning-based GAD systems in a black-box
setting. Results show that BinarizedAttack can also evade
those systems that it is not designed for, greatly relaxing the
information requirement for the attackers. Overall, our study
demonstrates that current GAD systems are indeed vulnerable
to structural poisoning attacks. Our research also opens the
door to investigating the adversarial robustness of other graph-
based security analytic tools under this new type of attacks.
We leave the defense of structural attacks as an important
direction of future works.
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